This paper investigates the employment consequences of buyouts by politically connected private equity firms. We find that politically connected private equity firms boost employment at their target firms following a buyout. The increase in employment is both statistically and economically significant. We provide evidence that the results are unlikely to be due to politically connected private equity firms selecting different types of targets than non-connected firms. The results are instead consistent with an "exchange of favors" story. For example, politically connected private equity firms boost employment especially during election years and more so in states with high corruption.
Lawmakers and labor unions have often criticized private equity (in particular "buyout") firms for being quick to eliminate jobs at the companies they acquire.
1 This criticism appears to be supported to different degrees by academic and industry-sponsored studies (see, for example, Kaplan (1989) , A.T. Kerney (2007) , Shapiro and Pham (2008) , and Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner and Miranda (2011) ). Perhaps not surprisingly, the private equity expertise of Mitt Romney was the subject of a contentious debate during the 2012 presidential election. 2 Interestingly, while the connection between presidential candidate Romney and private equity firm Bain Capital is well known, it may be surprising to learn that this kind of connection is far from unique. In fact, almost one fourth of U.S. private equity firms are well-connected to prominent politicians. 3 In this study, we address the question of whether politically connected private equity firms are less prone to fire workers at the companies they acquire than their non-politically connected peers. Anecdotal evidence supports this claim. For example, according to the Wall Street Journal, the White House played a crucial role in encouraging the Carlyle Group, a politically connected private equity firm, to take a majority stake in a Philadelphia oil refinery, allegedly "saving 850 unionized jobs" just before the 2012 presidential election. is whether or not these kinds of employment dynamics are found, on average, in politically connected private equity firms.
To investigate our question, we identify investments by private equity buyout firms from Capital IQ. Our sample consists of 513 targets acquired by private equity buyout firms during 1980 to 2008. We also use Capital IQ to gather biographical information on the private equity firms' general partners, board members and top employees. We use these data to identify the political connections (if any) of each private equity firm. We find that 23% of the private equity firms are politically connected. Further, we document that 55.4% of the targets in our sample are acquired by a buyout syndicate/club that includes at least one politically connected private equity firm.
We track employment growth in the targets using data from Capital IQ, Mergent Online, and Compustat. We find that, on average, employment declines by 4.95% per year following a buyout by a non-politically connected private equity firm. However, on average, employment increases by 1.69% per year following a buyout by a politically connected private equity firm.
This evidence is consistent with political connections leading to boosts in employment, even among targets of the highly criticized private equity buyout firms.
As in every empirical study, a caveat in the interpretation of the results is the issue of endogeneity. In particular, different types of private equity firms might select targets with different job dynamics. For example, non-politically connected private equity firms could invest in targets that are declining at faster rates than the targets selected by politically connected private equity firms. We use a firm fixed effects specification to mitigate this concern. In particular, the fixed effects specification removes any cross-sectional correlation between employment growth and political connections (or lack thereof). Using this specification thus greatly mitigates the risk of a spurious correlation.
Second, we use a propensity score matching procedure to compare targets backed by politically connected private equity firms to a group of virtually indistinguishable peers, in terms of observable pre-buyout characteristics, that are backed instead by non-connected private equity firms. We then compare the employment growth following private equity investment between the two groups. As the control firms are restricted to a set of peers that is almost identical in terms of ex-ante observable characteristics, firms backed by politically connected private equity firms are expected to make the same choices as firms backed by non-connected private equity firms. We find that targets of politically connected private equity firms experience significantly higher employment growth during the five years after the buyout. We further show that targets of politically connected private equity firms also exhibit higher post-buyout employment growth than a control group of non-private equity-backed companies.
Third, if politically connected private equity firms were targeting firms with higher expected growth, we should observe that some of employment growth occurs in the years immediately surrounding the buyout. To alleviate this selection concern, we modify the propensity score analysis to also match on the characteristics of target firms in the buyout year and/or the year immediately following a buyout. The results of this analysis show that postbuyout employment grows more among targets of politically connected private equity firms, even after controlling for expectations about employment growth.
This evidence begs the question of why politically connected private equity firms boost employment at their targets. Perhaps some private equity firms boost employment to maintain good public relations and/or good relations with the government. Private equity principals and/or politicians might also boost employment to promote their own social capital and career concerns.
It could also be the case that the employment growth documented among the targets of politically connected private equity firms is part of an "exchange of favors" between politicians and firms. Consistent with this "exchange of favors" story, we document that among the targets of politically connected private equity firms, the observed increase in employment is concentrated among private equity investments during election years and is more pronounced in states with high levels of corruption. However, it is difficult to determine the ultimate beneficiaries of employment growth. At one level, employees at the target firms benefit because they are able to keep their jobs. However, if the employment levels that we observe are sub-optimal, there may be negative economic implications. At a deeper level, the private equity investors and principals might benefit if the high employment growth allows the target firms or the private equity firms to obtain sizeable enough benefits from the government. Of course, politicians may also benefit if high employment might enable them to get re-elected. Since we are not able to identify the ultimate beneficiaries of employment growth in a comprehensive fashion in this study, our data cannot explicitly rule out the other explanations. (2009)), and strengthen corporate governance (Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013) ). Private equity also helps target firms innovate more (Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) ), makes them more cost-efficient (Kaplan and
Strömberg (2009)), and helps them emerge more quickly and efficiently from financial distress (Hotchkiss, Smith, and Strömberg (2011) ).
Probably the most controversial issue in this literature is the effect of private equity on employment. One view posits that private equity, and in particular leveraged buyouts, destroy jobs. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that private equity investors "sucked the lifeblood out of GST Steel … destroying jobs and eliminating pensions."
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The academic and industry-sponsored studies cited in the opening paragraph provide support for this claim, although they disagree on the magnitude of the effect.
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For example, for a sample of 76 large buyouts completed between 1980 and 1986 , Kaplan (1989 Stigler (1971) , Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), and De Soto (1989) ), a lower likelihood of fraud detection (Yu and Yu (2011) ) and less severe enforcement outcomes (Fulmer and Knill (2012) ).
However, there is much less evidence about the benefits that politicians extract from companies. Presumably, as modeled by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) , politicians provide aid to firms in exchange for personal benefits, such as votes and/or cash payments. An exception is Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) , who document that French firms connected to politicians create more jobs, especially around election years and in more contested regions.
In this paper, we provide further evidence about a channel (employment) through which political connections might affect firm value. Importantly, we provide evidence that political connections substantially affect corporate decisions in the vital private sector of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and the identification of politically connected private equity firms. Section II presents the main regressions results, i.e., the effect of politically connected private equity firms on target firms' employment growth following the buyout. Section III provides further analyses that address endogeneity concerns. Section IV presents other robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Data

A. Data and Sample Construction
Information on private equity firms and their buyout targets comes from Capital IQ. From this database we identify the sample of private equity targets using the following criteria: (1) the target firm is located in the U.S., (2) the transaction occurred between 1980 and 2008, (3) the acquirer includes (at least) one investment firm that has a reported investment interest in one of the following stages: bridge, buyout, early venture, emerging growth, growth capital, incubation, industry consolidation, late venture, mature, mezzanine/subdebt, middle market, mid-venture, pipes, seed/startup, or turnaround. To identify buyout targets, we follow Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2012) and select transactions classified as "leveraged buyout,"
"management buyout," or "going private transactions." We focus on buyouts as this type of transaction has been the most heavily criticized for "destroying" jobs. (Note that we do not take a stance on the efficiency of employment cuts or its optimality from the perspective of the private equity firms.)
We obtain employment data from Capital IQ, Mergent Online, and Compustat. We track employment for up to five years after the private equity transaction. We use Capital IQ to identify corporate bankruptcies within 5 years following a buyout. In the event of a bankruptcy, we replace missing data (in Capital IQ, Mergent Online, and Compustat) on employment in the year following a bankruptcy with zeros. We truncate the sample five years after the initial private equity investment, as this represents the typical holding period of private equity funds (Strömberg (2007) ). 8 The final sample includes 513 private equity targets and 5,952 target firm-year observations. Additional accounting information for the private equity target firms, including firm size (proxied by the book value of assets) and growth (proxied by firms' sales growth)
comes from Capital IQ, Mergent Online and Compustat.
B. Identifying Politically Connected Private Equity Firms
From Capital IQ, we extract biographical information for each individual in the 422 private equity firms that invest in our sample of 513 targets to determine whether these private equity firms are politically connected. These individuals are primarily the private equity firms'
(general) partners, directors, vice-presidents, and top employees (such as associates and principals). 10 On average, the typical buyout syndicate/club includes 1.65 private equity firms.
II. Employment Dynamics
In Table 1 we provide univariate results and descriptive statistics for the targets of politically connected and non-connected private equity firms. During the pre-buyout period, the average annual change in employment for targets of politically connected private equity firms is 10.37% while the average annual change in employment for targets of non-connected private equity firms is 11.81%. Following a buyout, the average annual change in employment for targets of politically connected private equity firms declines to 1.69%, but the average annual change in employment for targets of non-connected private equity firms drops even further to -4.95%. The difference between the two is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.05.
Thus, following a buyout, only the subsample of firms targeted by politically connected private equity firms has positive average growth in employment.
We also uncover significant differences in other firm attributes such as size and sales growth (which we account for in later tests). Since the targets of politically connected and nonconnected private equity firms appear to be different on multiple dimensions (only some of which, due to data constraints, we can observe), we include target firm fixed-effects in all regression specifications to mitigate any endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables. These fixed effects control for the possibility that, for reasons other than the private equity firms' political connections, their targets might systematically increase the number of employees at a faster rate than targets of non-connected private equity firms.
[ Table 1 goes here]
In Table 2 we present OLS panel regressions of the relation between political connections and employment. Regression (1) includes a Post PE indicator that takes the value of one if the observation year is after an investment by a private equity firm (as reported in Capital IQ) and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the Post PE indicator captures the change in employment following the private equity investment (relative to the employment change before the investment). Among targets of non-politically connected private equity firms, the rate of growth in employment (reported in regression (1)) is lower by 6.8 percentage points after the private equity investment. This figure is not dissimilar in magnitude to the changes typically documented in the literature (e.g., Kaplan, (1989)). The post-buyout reduction in employment growth appears large when compared to an average pre-buyout annual rate of growth of 11.81%.
[ Table 2 goes here]
We also interact the Post PE indicator with a Politically Connected indicator, which takes the value of one if at least one of the target firm's private equity investors is politically connected (as defined above) and zero otherwise.
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This interaction reflects the differences in the postbuyout employment growth rates of targets of politically connected private equity firms as compared to targets of non-connected private equity firms. The positive sign on the interaction term indicates that the decline in employment is less pronounced among targets of politically connected private equity firms. In fact, among targets of politically connected private equity firms, employment grows on average following a buyout.
Recalling that targets of connected and non-connected private equity firms differ on several dimensions, we progressively add controls for these possible omitted variables. As expected, we find that targets that experience a high growth (decline) in revenues also increase (cut) employment. Also as expected, employment grows at a faster rate among smaller firms.
More importantly, across all regressions we find that target firm employment grows on average 11 The firm fixed effects capture the time-invariant Politically Connected private equity firm indicator.
following buyouts from politically connected private equity firms. In this sense, politically connected private equity buyout firms create jobs, on average, rather than destroying them.
III. Endogeneity Concerns
A. Propensity Score Matching
A caveat in the interpretation of our results is the issue of endogeneity. For example, Table 1 shows that targets of politically connected private equity firms differ from targets of non-connected firms in several dimensions, such as size and sales growth. Perhaps the observed differences in employment dynamics observed post-private equity investment are related to differences in firm attributes (or combinations of attributes) rather than the presence or absence of political ties.
In our regressions specifications, we controlled for those observable attributes to reduce the risk of drawing conclusions based on spurious correlations. In this section, we employ a propensity score matching procedure to further address this concern. In particular, we compare targets of politically connected private equity firms to targets of non-connected private equity firms that display similar observable characteristics.
For this purpose, we employ the propensity score matching procedure of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . This procedure allows us to identify a control group of targets of non-connected private equity firms that exhibit minimal observable difference in attributes in comparison to the targets of politically connected private equity firms. We then compare the post-private equity investment employment growth between the two groups. As the control firms are virtually indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics, the targets of politically connected private equity firms are expected to exhibit the same post-private equity investment employment growth patterns as the targets of non-connected private equity firms.
In Panel A of Table 3 we match targets based on the time series mean of observable characteristics during the 5 years preceding a buyout. We do so by computing the probability that a firm with given characteristics is targeted by a politically connected private equity firm. This probability is estimated as a function of the natural log of the time series means of target firm size, sales growth and employment growth during the 5 years preceding a buyout as well as industry and year indicators. To ensure that the firms in the control group are sufficiently similar to the targets of politically connected private equity firms, we require that the maximum difference between the propensity score of the targets of politically connected private equity firms and the score of matching peers does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value.
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Given this constraint, we find a match for 190 out of the 284 targets of politically connected private equity firms.
In Panel A of Table 3 , as a reference, we report the mean of the time series mean of annual pre-buyout characteristics (employment growth, the log of firm size and sales growth) for targets of politically connected private equity firms and for targets of non-connected private equity firms. As expected, after matching there are no major differences in these pre-buyout characteristics between the different groups. More importantly, the results in Panel A of Table 3 show that even when holding pre-buyout observable firm characteristics virtually indistinguishable between the two groups, targets of politically connected private equity firms 12 From the resulting set of possible matching peers, we select up to five control firms with the closest propensity scores for each politically connected private equity firm. We average the time series of annual mean characteristics among each set of (up to five) matching peers so as to have a single "matching peer equivalent" for each single target of politically connected private equity firms.
increase employment significantly more than firms in the control group (targets of nonconnected private equity firms) after the private equity investment.
[ Table 3 goes here]
A related endogeneity concern is that politically connected private equity firms might select targets that are expected to shift their hiring decisions (in particular, increase employment)
around the time of the buyout. If that were the case, the increase in employment observed after the private equity investment is not a consequence but rather the cause of politically connected private equity buyouts. While this selection story may be plausible, it implies that employment would presumably increase in the year before, the year of, and/or the year after a buyout by a politically connected private equity firm. Longer term employment needs would likely be harder to predict and therefore would be less likely to be a central factor in the selection of targets. We therefore investigate the dynamics of employment growth more in detail using different windows for matching purposes.
In Panel B, the propensity score is estimated as a function of the means of the time series of the natural log of average target firm size, sales growth and employment growth from the 5 years preceding a buyout to the end of the buyout year, along with industry and year indicators.
We continue to require that the maximum difference between the propensity score of the targets of politically connected private equity firms and the score of matching peers does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. The results in Panel B of Table 3 show that, even holding pre-buyout and buyout-year firm attributes virtually indistinguishable between the two groups, targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment significantly more than firms in the control group after the private equity investment. In Panel C we show that the same conclusions obtain if we match based on average target firm size, sales growth and employment growth during the period starting 5 years preceding a buyout and ending in the year following a buyout, along with industry and year indicators. In Panel D we further assess the robustness of our results to alternatively matching based on characteristics in the buyout year only (rather than time series averages of the characteristics). When we do so, our conclusions are once again unchanged.
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we compare targets of politically connected private equity firms with a control group of non-private equity-backed companies. We use Compustat to identify the non-private equity-backed companies. We begin by removing all private equity targets (as defined in Section I.A) from the universe of firms in Compustat. We then use the propensity score matching procedure used in Panel A to identify a control group of non-private equity-backed companies with virtually indistinguishable attributes relative to the targets of politically connected private equity firms.
We find that employment grows more for targets of politically connected private equity firms even when compared to a similar group of non-buyout firms (Panel E, Table 3 ). These results further corroborate the claim that politically connected private equity firms cause employment to grow following a buyout.
B. Elections
To further test the selection story we look at employment cycles around election years.
As private equity investment is randomly distributed through time (e.g. it is not concentrated during election years), a "selection" story does not predict that employment growth will be more pronounced around election years. However, the "exchange of favors" story, in which politically connected private equity firms intentionally alter the hiring decision of their targets to curry favor with their political allies (with the hope of receiving back benefits in the future), does predict that employment growth will be more pronounced in election years.
In Table 4 , Panel A, we investigate whether this is the case. In particular, we distinguish between transactions that occurred in "election years" and transactions that occurred in "nonelection years." Election years consist of years in which a Presidential election takes place as well as the year immediately prior to a Presidential election. Non-election years are the two years following a Presidential election. The results show that the growth in employment observed among targets of politically connected private equity firms is more pronounced (relative to targets of non-connected private equity firms) for transactions that occurred in election years. In contrast, we find no significant difference in employment growth between targets of politically connected and non-connected private equity firms for transactions that occurred in non-election years. This result is consistent with an exchange of favors story and inconsistent with a selection story.
[ Table 4 goes here]
In Panel B of Table 4 we delve further into the specific political connections found in our sample and investigate whether the impact of political connections is stronger when the private equity firm is connected to the Presidential party in power. The results indicate that this is the case. Following a buyout by a politically connected private equity firm, significant employment growth is not only concentrated during election years but also specifically concentrated in firms connected with the winning Presidential party. This result makes intuitive sense, as politically connected private equity firms are less likely to boost employment to support the party that is expected to lose the election (since the election losers are less likely to be able to provide the theorized "exchange of favors").
C. State-Level Corruption and Employment Growth
The analysis in the previous section shows that the employment growth experienced by private equity target firms is especially pronounced during election years. The "exchange of favors" story suggests that these results reflect exchanges of favors between firms and politicians. If this is the case, we would expect the increase in employment experienced by targets of politically connected private equity firms to be more pronounced in areas where exchanges of favors are more likely to occur, i.e., in more corrupt states. In this section we investigate whether this is indeed the case.
More specifically, we investigate whether differences in the level of corruption in the state in which private equity target firms are headquartered are associated with differences in 
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This measure has been widely used in the existing literature to gauge the degree of corruption at the state level (Meier and Holbrook (1992) and Goel and Nelson (1998) ). We also use a survey of 834 State House reporters (members of the press who cover state government)
conducted by Boylan and Long (2003) and published in State Politics and Policy Quarterly. The survey contained eight questions including the extent to which the media covered public corruption cases, the (estimated) percentage of government employees who submitted fraudulent expense reports, the diffusion of bribery in a given state, etc. We classify states with an above median corruption index as "high corruption" states. 13 The data come from the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2010, prepared by the Department of Justice.
In Table 5 we investigate whether employment dynamics are associated with differences in the level of state corruption. We find that post-buyout employment growth among targets of politically connected private equity firms is higher in more corrupt states. This result reinforces a quid pro quo story, while it is more difficult to reconcile with a selection story.
[ Table 5 goes here]
IV. Other Robustness Tests
In this section, we undertake other analyses to ensure the robustness of the main results in Section II. These analyses include (1) using two-year employment growth and (2) using the levels of employment as dependent variables in a panel regressions framework.
A. Two-year Employment Growth as the Dependent Variable
A potential concern with the main analysis discussed in Section II is that the dependent variable (annual employment growth) may reflect target firms' temporary, year-by-year hiring and firing decisions rather than their long-term hiring trends. To further assess whether targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment on average over a longer-term basis in the post-private equity periods, in Table 6 we re-run the panel regressions of Table 2 using the two-year percentage change in employment (i.e., the natural log of employment in the observation year minus the natural log of employment two years prior to the observation year) as the dependent variable. We continue to find positive and significant coefficients for the interaction term of the Post PE indicator and the Politically Connected indicator (Regressions (1) to (4)). In unreported analyses, we find that the effects of political connections on employment are pronounced in elections years, but are not statistically significant during non-election years.
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 further corroborate our main findings: for targets of politically connected private equity firms, employment grows following a buyout.
[ Table 6 goes here]
B. The Level of Employment as the Dependent Variable
So far, the analyses focused on the effect of political connections on the growth in employment. Table 7 reports the panel regressions with the level of employment as the dependent variable. Consistent with our previous findings for employment growth, employment levels increase among targets of politically connected private equity firms after private equity investment (Regressions (1) to (4)). Our initial findings are therefore robust to using the level of employment as the dependent variable.
[ Table 7 goes here]
V. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the employment dynamics among targets of private equity buyout firms. In contrast to widespread criticisms of private equity, we document that politically connected private equity firms significantly boost employment following a buyout. Since political connections are widespread among private equity firms, our findings suggest that this criticism of the private equity industry does not reflect the reality of many private equity buyout outcomes.
Using several strategies to address endogeneity concerns, we show that the results are unlikely to be entirely due to selection of targets with higher expected (employment) growth by politically connected private equity buyout firms. The results, at least in part, instead appear to be consistent with an exchange of favors story. In particular, the evidence is consistent with politically connected private equity firms altering their hiring and firing decision to support the election of their political allies.
14 Thus, the political cycle story documented for France by Bertrand et al. (2007) extends to the U.S., and more importantly, to the vital and growing private equity industry. After considering the effect of private equity firms' political connections on employment, some of the earlier conclusions and criticisms about this industry may need to be reconsidered.
14 We do not investigate the benefits that private equity firms (or their targets) may subsequently receive from politicians, as the existing literature on political connections has almost entirely focused on those payoffs.
Table 1. Univariate Statistics
Panel A reports the mean (medians) of the time series mean of employment growth prior to a private equity buyout ("Pre-PE") and during the (up to) five years following a buyout ("Post-PE") for 284 targets of politically connected private equity firms and 229 targets of non-connected private equity firms. Employment Growth is the annual rate of employment growth, i.e., Ln (1+employment in the observation year) -Ln (1+employment in the previous year). Panel B reports the mean (medians) of the time series mean, over the entire sample period, of firm size and sales growth for the targets of politically connected and non-connected private equity firms. Assets is the target firm's book value of assets. Sales Growth is the target firm's annual rate of growth of sales, i.e., Ln (sales in the observation year) -Ln (sales in the previous year). ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. This table contains estimates from panel regressions of target firms' employment growth on whether their private equity investors are politically connected. The dependent variable is the annual rate of employment growth, i.e., Ln (1+employment in the observation year) -Ln (1+employment in the previous year). Politically Connected is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the target firm's private equity investors is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Post PE is an indicator equal to one if the observation year is after the initial investment by a private equity firm, and zero otherwise. Assets is the target firm's book value of assets. Sales Growth is the target firm's annual rate of growth of sales, i.e., Ln (sales in the observation year) -Ln (sales in the previous year). T-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%.
(1) In this table, we identify control samples using a propensity score matching procedure. In Panels A-D, the control sample consists of targets of non-connected private equity firms. In Panel A, the control peers are selected based on the time series mean of firm size, sales growth and employment growth during the 5 years preceding a buyout (as well as industry and year indicators). In Panel B, the control group is selected based on the time series mean of firm characteristics during the period starting 5 years preceding a buyout and ending at the end of the buyout year. In Panel C, the control group is selected based on the time series mean of firm characteristics during the period starting 5 years preceding a buyout and ending at the end of the year following a buyout. In Panel D, the control group is selected based on the target firms' characteristics during the buyout year. In Panel E, the control group consists of non-private equity-backed firms. In all panels, the treatment group consists of targets of politically connected private equity firms. In estimating the propensity scores, we require that the difference between the propensity score of targets of politically connected private equity firms and its matching peer does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. Post-PE Employment Growth (t, T) is the mean of the time series mean of annual employment growth during the window starting t years after and ending T years after the buyout. Pre-PE Employment Growth (-K, -k) is the mean of the time series mean of annual employment growth during the window starting K years prior and ending k years prior (or following, if positive) a buyout. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
Tstatistics
Post-PE Employment
Growth (1, 5) Boylan and Long (2003) . We classify states with an above median corruption index as "high corruption" states. Assets is the target firm's book value of assets. Sales Growth is the target firm's annual rate of growth of sales, i.e., Ln (sales in the observation year) -Ln (sales in the previous year). T-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%.
(1) This table contains estimates from panel regressions of target firms' 2-year employment growth on whether their private equity investors are politically connected. The dependent variable is the two-year rate of employment growth, i.e., Ln (1+employment in the observation year) -Ln (1+employment two years prior to the observation year). Politically Connected is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the target firm's private equity investors is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Post PE is an indicator equal to one if the observation year is after the initial investment by a private equity firm, and zero otherwise. Assets is the target firm's book value of assets. Sales Growth is the target firm's annual rate of growth of sales, i.e., Ln (sales in the observation year) -Ln (sales in the previous year). T-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%.
(1) This table contains estimates from panel regressions of target firms' employment levels on whether their private equity investors are politically connected. The dependent variable is the natural log of employment, i.e., Ln(1+employment in the observation year). Politically Connected is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the target firm's private equity investors is politically connected, and zero otherwise. Post PE is an indicator equal to one if the observation year is after the initial investment by a private equity firm, and zero otherwise. Assets is the target firm's book value of assets. Sales Growth is the target firm's annual rate of growth of sales, i.e., Ln (sales in the observation year) -Ln (sales in the previous year). T-statistics, based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%.
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